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cation, and interpretation of the collective agreement itself, but
also any dispute which might arise in respect of matters not pro-
vided for in the agreement." In other words, the parties intended
to include "any dispute. . with reference to any matter not pro-
vided for in this contract.' ' 4 Thus, arbitration was ordered.
Judge Desmond, dissenting, seems to argue from the theorythat a labor union only has those rights which are specificallygranted by the collective contract and that those not granted are
retained by management. 5 Since the agreement in question places
no restriction on the employer's common-law right to dischargeits employees with or without cause,"8 "there is nothing here to
arbitrate. '17
The parties to a collective agreement are familiar with the
many problems and complexities inherent in the relations which
they are attempting to control through the labor contract. They
therefore realize that it would be impossible to provide in a writteninstrument for every contingency which might arise and that arbi-
tration of disputes is the logical solution to this inability to put
everything down on paper. The majority in the instant case,therefore, has followed the intent of the parties to settle their dis-putes through the arbitration process.
X.- Muqic-A CoPoRATiolqs
Civil Service
The New York Civil Service Law spells out the mandate ofthe New York Constitution requiring that the civil service of the
state and all its civil divisions shall be on the basis of merit andfitness determined as far as practicable by competitive examina-
13. Where the courts are asked to intervene prior to arbitration, they. have heldthat their function is limited to a determination of two questions: 1.) was an agree-ment to arbitrate made, and 2.) has'there been a refusal to arbitrate. Mencher v. B. S.Abeles and Kahn, 274 App. Div. 585, 590, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 718, 723 (1st Dep't 1948).C P. A. § 1450 provides that the court's function is merely to determine whether "awritten contract providing for arbitration was made. .. and there was a failure to
comply therewith."For an excellent and complete survey of the court's role in regard to labor arbi-tra4on, see Summers, Judicial Reziew of Labor Arbitration, 2 BFro. L. REv. 1 (1952).14. Lipman v. Hauser Shellac Co., 289 N. Y. 76, 80, 43 N. E. 2d 817, 819 (1942).However, the Lipman case concerns a contract for the sale of merchandise and is not
a collective bargaining agreement. The failure of the New York courts to distinguishbetween ordinary and collective contracts has been severely criticized. See Summers,
.rnpra note 13 at 14.15. General Electric Co. v. U. E. P. & M. W. A.-C. L, 0., 196 Misc. 143, 91N. Y. S. 2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1949).16. Watson v. Gugino, 204 N. Y. 535, 541, 98 N. E. 18, 20 (1912) ; Martin v. NewYork Life Insurance Company, 148 N. Y. 117, 121, 42 N. E. 416, 417 (1895).17. This is also the position taken by-the Appellate Division. Bohlinger v. NationalCash Register Co., 280 App. Div. 751, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 46 (1st Dep't 1952).
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tions,' The civil service is under the Department of Civil Service,2
headed by the State Civil Service Commission.3  The Commission
is composed of three members, not more than two of whom can
be adherents to the same political party,4 appointed by the Gover-
nor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.' The duty
of the Commission, in general, is to effectuate the merit system.,
It is thus empowered to prescribe, amend and enforce suitable
rules and regulations' and to make investigations" concerning the
enforcement and effect of the Civil Service Law. Commensurate
with the spirit, if not the necessity, of the home rule provisions
of the Constitution,9 the local governmental units enjoy consider-
able autonomy in the civil service by virtue of their own local
municipal civil service commissions ° which are empowered to
make rules for classification, examinations, appointments and pro-
motions in conformance to the Constitution and the Civil Service
Law.'
1
The autonomy of the municipal civil service commissions was
vindicated by the Court of Appeals in two cases. In l1irzberger
v. Watson 2 the New York City Municipal Civil Service Commis-
sion revised certain requisite qualifications to sit for promotional
examinations in the Clerical Service, thereby excluding interserv-
ice participation in the examinations as to some services but not
as to other services. The Commission maintained, that the new
qualifications would promote administrative efficiency, and such
interservice participation as was permitted was from services
where otherwise there would be no chance for promotion. The
Appellate Division had held the Commission's qualifications as
arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals in
reversing held that the Civil Service Law confers the duty of
establishing preliminary requirements for promotional examina-
tions upon the Commission alone'3 and the court will not interfere
with a decision of the commission, an administrative agency, where
any fair argument can be made to sustain its action.'
4
1. N. Y. CoNsT. Art. V, § 6.
2. Id. §2. ,
3. Crvm SERIcE LAw § 3.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.; N. Y. CONST. Art. V, § 4.
6. Cn-m SERVICE LAW § 6.
7. Id. § 6 subd. 1.
8. Id. § 6 subds. 3, 4.
9. N. Y. CoNsT. Art. 1X, § 1, 11.
10. Crwm SERVICE LAW §9 11, 11-a, authorize municipal civil service commissions
ior cities and counties respectively.
11. CIVIL SER IcE LAW §§ 11 subds. 1, 2, 11-a subd. I for cities and counties
respectively.
12. 305 N. Y. 507, 114 N. E. 2d 15 (.1953).
13. CvM SERVICE LAW § 14 subd. 2.
14. People ex rel Moriarity v. Creelman, 206 N. Y. 570, 575-576, 100 N. E. 446.
448 (1912).
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Local municipal civil service commissions notwithstanding,
the maintenance and protection of the merit system in the civil
service is a matter of state concern, and the State Civil Service
Commission has, by general law, cognizance over the municipal
civil service commissions. 5 Coupled -with its powers of investi-
gation the Civil Service Law § 11 subd. 7 prescribes that the
"state commission may at any time, by unanimous vote of the
three commissioners, amend or rescind any rule, regulation or
classification [of a municipal civil service commission] or rescind
any examination or eligible list or cancel an appointment already
imade from a list so rescinded . . .where the provisions or pur-
poses . . . [of the Civil Service Law] are not properly or suffi-
ciently carried out . . ." Italics are ours and indicate a new
phrase added in 1944.'. Prior to 1944, once a civil service employee
in the competitive class under the merit system was placed on the
eligible list (from which appointments are made), such employees'
eligibility was final unless set aside on the ground of illegality,
fraud, or irregularity in vital matters ;17 otherwise an appointee's
removal could only be for incompetency or misconduct.
8
Pursuant to the revised powers, the State Civil Service Com-
mission made an investigation of the Lackawanna Municipal Civil
Service Commission and its examinations, eligibility lists and
appointments. The State Commission found that the qualifying
examinations of fifteen employees were not practical or sufficient
tests of capacity and fitness, and ordered the removal of those
"employees. In Ebling v. New York State Civil Service Commis-
sion'9 the employees sought an order in the nature of mandamus
to compel the State Commission to reinstate them. The employees
produced affidavits of five experts concurring in the view that
their examinations had been fair tests of fitness. The gist of the
ease devolved upon the court's interpretation of the legislative
intent behind the wording of § 11 subd. 7 that the "state commis-
sion may at any time . . .rescind any examination or eligible list
or cancel an appointment already made from a list so rescinded
. . .where the provisions or purposes [of the Civil Service Law]
are not properly or sufficiently carried.out . . ." The court in a
3-1-3 decision, by Judge Desmond, held that "provisions or pur-
poses" meant the prime fundamental purposes of the Civil Service
Law and that at least as to these appointees, there could be no
cancellation "unless the examination had been so obviously inade-
15. Matter of Kaney v. State Civil Service Commission, 190 Misc. 944, 950, 77
N. Y. S. 2d 8, 15 (Sup. Ct 1948), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 1054, 81 N. Y. S. 2d 168 (4th
Dep't 1948), aff'd, 298 N. Y. 707, 83 N. E. 2d 11 (1948).
16. L. 1944, c. 435, effective 31 March 1944.
17. See People ,. McBride, 226 N. Y. 252, 258, 123 X. E. 374, 376 (1919).
18. Civm SERVICE LAw § 22.
19. 305 N. Y. 221, 112 N. E. 2d 203 (1953).
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quate, or so completely unrelated to the duties of the position, as
to be on its face a nullity." Here, on the record, there was no
more than a difference of opinion as to the quality and compre-
hensiveness of the tests. Here the employees who had continued
in their appointments under the disputed examinations as long as
several years would be removed from their jobs with no showing
of fault on their part or fraud by anyone. While the legislature
could authorize such removals the court would not construe such
a "truly extraordinary result" where a more reasonable construc-
tion would place this provision within "the traditional legislative
policy in this State of furnishing effective protection to civil serv-
ice appointees." Judge Conway, in concurring, felt that the State
Commission's rescission must be executed within a reasonable
time, but the majority opinion stated that a new appointee in
reliance upon the appointment may well have jeopardized outside
opportunities.
The dissent, in reciting some of the disputed examination
questions20 stated that State Commission's finding that there was
no practical or sufficient test of the employees' capacity and fitness
was to the same effect as if the employees had been appointed and
promoted without taking the requisite examination and therefore
the appointments were invalid regardless of good faith.2' The
court need only compare the specifications for duties in the various
positions with the actual examination questions to establish "their
utter deficienoy ' 1, and upon these utterly deficient examinations
employees were appointed who are responsible for the protection
of the lives, liberty and the property of the People of the State.
Furthermore the intent of the legislature to empower the State
Commission to make such removals was plainly expressed.
The Wirzberger case conformed with the traditional attitude
of the court that it will not interfere with an administrative agency
regarding discretionary, policy-making powers in matters of dis-
puted fact and differing opinion. The Ebling case was ultimately
decided upon essentially the same rationale but involved a conflict
of the most fundamental precepts of the state civil service system,
coupled with patently constitutional legislation which on its face
would seem to authorize a course of action contradictory to tradi-
tional legislative policy in the civil service field. The tenor of the
majority opinion indicates probably more concern over what might
be done in future instances if removal had here been permitted
than as to the immediate situation. It would seem to this writer
that the "majority" view in the Ebling case will in the long run
20. The dissenting opinion in the instant case recites some of the questions asked on
the examinations.
21. The dissent citing Palmer v. Hoard of Education,, 276 N. Y. 222, 11 N. E. 2d 887(1937).
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best serve the interests of the people of the State as well as its
civil service employees. Furthermore there still remain alterna-
tive measures to remedy any abuse in the immediate case. Granted
a total inadequacy of the qualifying examinations, this does not
mean per se that those appointees are unfit. While in a practical
sense not fully adequate, removal may be effected under the Civil
Service Law for incompetency or unfitness. The proper precau-
tions should better lie in a close and punctual scrutiny of the
municipal commissions rather than jeopardizing the desirable
stability and security of the civil service system to remedy a past
neglect.
Muniipal Tort Liability
To bring a tort action against a municipal corporation, a
notice of claim must be served in person or by registered mail on
the proper municipal party within 90 days after the claim arises
as required by General Municipal Law § 50-e.22  Service of such
claim must strictly comply with the statutory requirements. 23 The
court in dealing with the exact statutory wording, delivered two
somewhat contradictory decisions.
In Teresta v. City of New York,24 the city having been served
a notice of claim by ordinary mail, rather than registered mail,
notified claimant to appear for examination, examined claimant
and did not raise the issue of improper service until the trial
commenced. The Appellate Division had held25 service was im-
proper for lack of strict statutory compliance,26 but the Court of
Appeals reversed (5-2) on the ground that "present here, in addi-
tion to an unequivocal waiver, are elements of estoppel. '27 The
basis of the dissent by Judge Lewis was that of strict statutory
compliance. Subsequent to the litigated service, but prior to the
court's opinion, as noted in the majority opinion,28 the Legislature
had amended § 50-e so as to validate service by ordinary mail
22. The purpose of such claim notice is to afford municipalities protection against
needless litigation, stale claims and possible connivance of corrupt officials. Brozw; v.
Bnard of Trustees of Town of Hamptonburq, 303 N. Y. 484, 490, 104 N. E. 2d 866, 869(1952).2. Thomann v. City of Rochester, 256 N. Y. 165, 172, 176 N. E. 129, 131 (1931);
Matter of Merkle v. County of .Nrassan, 197 Misc. 560, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 673 (Sup. Ct.
1950).'
24. 304 N. Y. 440, 108 N. E. 2d 397 (1952).
25. Teresta v. City of New York, 277 App. Div. 787, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 335 (1st Dep't1950).
26. One year later the 2d Dep't went directly contrary to, the 1st Dep't in the
Teresta case. Drake v. Comptrolier of City of New York, 278 App. Div. 317, 318-319,
104 N. Y. S. 2d 774 (2d Dep't 1951), per Justice Van Voorhis.
27. Teresta v. City of New York. supra note 24 at 433, 108 N. E. 2d at 398.
28. Id. at 442. 108 N E. 2d at 397.
